James Adam, The Republic of Plato

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ὥσπερ ἐν μάχῃ κτλ.: ‘as it were in a battle, exhausting every elenchus, striving to test his view not by that which seems, but by that which is’ etc. For διὰ πάντων—διεξιών cf. Thuc. III 45. 3 διεξεληλύθασί γε διὰ πασῶν τῶν ζημιῶν and Parm. 136 E διὰ πάντων διεξόδου. We apply the ἔλεγχοι ourselves: cf. ἐξελέγξωμεν in X 610 A. The ordinary interpretation supposes that the ἔλεγχοι are applied by others (‘running the gauntlet of all questionings’ J. and C.); but in that case we must take ἐλέγχειν as=ἐλέγχειν τοὺς τῶν ἄλλων ἐλέγχους, which is difficult, because ἐλέγχειν is most naturally interpreted by ἐλέγχων just before, and ἐλέγχων certainly means tests or elenchi which are applied to the theory which the dialectician is himself maintaining. Plato means that the dialectician tests his view of good not by ‘seeming’ i.e. by what ‘seems’ (good, bad etc.) to the many, but by the Truth i.e. by that which ‘is’ in the Platonic sense of οὐσία, viz. the Ideas, such as (let us say) the Ideas of κάλλος, δίκαιον and so forth. The Idea of Good has connexions and relations with all the other Ideas (cf. VI 510 B, 511 B notes); and our knowledge of these may therefore be used to test the accuracy of our conception of Good. Zeller^{4} II 1. p. 620 note rightly compares the present passage with Parm. 135 C—136 E: see App. III. It is perhaps unnecessary to notice Liebhold's foolish conjecture νόησιν for οὐσίαν.

ὀνειροπολοῦντα κτλ. 533 C note