[
1316b]
[31]
1We have already discussed
2 how many and what are the varieties of the
deliberative body or sovereign power in the state, and of the system of
magistracies and of law-courts, and which variety is adapted to which form of
constitution, and also
3 the
destruction of constitutions and their preservation, from what sort of people
they originate and what are their causes. But as a matter of fact since there
have come into existence several kinds of democracy and similarly of the other
forms of constitution, it will be well at the same time to consider
4 any point that
remains about these varieties, and also determine the mode of organization
appropriate and advantageous for each. And further we must also investigate
5 the
combinations of all the modes of organizing the actual departments of state that
have been mentioned,
6
[
1317a]
[1]
for these modes when coupled together make the constitutions overlap, so as to
produce oligarchical aristocracies and republics inclining towards democracy. I
refer to the combinations which ought to be investigated but have not at present
been studied, for example if the deliberative body and the system of electing
magistrates are organized oligarchically but the regulations as to the
law-courts aristocratically, or these and the structure of the deliberative body
oligarchically and the election of magistracy aristocratically, or if in some
other manner not all the parts of the constitution are appropriately
combined.
Now it has been stated before
7 what kind of democracy is
suited to what kind of state, and similarly which of the kinds of oligarchy is
suited to what kind of populace, and also which of the remaining constitutions
is advantageous for which people; but nevertheless since it must not only be
made clear which variety of these constitutions is best for states, but also how
both these best varieties and the other forms must be established, let us
briefly pursue the subject. And first let us speak about democracy; for at the
same time the facts will also become clear about the opposite form of
constitution, that is, the constitution which some people call oligarchy.
8
And
for this inquiry we must take into view all the features that are popular and
that are thought
[20]
to go with
democracies; for it comes about from combinations of these that the kinds of
democracy are formed, and that there are different democracies and more than one
sort. In fact there are two causes for there being several kinds of democracy,
first the one stated before, the fact that the populations are different
(for we find one multitude engaged in agriculture and another
consisting of handicraftsmen and day-laborers, and when the first of these is
added to the second and again the third to both of them it not only makes a
difference in that the quality of the democracy becomes better or worse but also
by its becoming different in kind); and the second cause is the one
about which we now speak. For the
institutions that go with democracies and seem to be appropriate to this form of
constitution make the democracies different by their combinations; for one form
of democracy will be accompanied by fewer, another by more, and another by all
of them. And it is serviceable to ascertain each of them both for the purpose of
instituting whichever of these kinds of democracy one happens to wish and for
the purpose of amending existing ones. For people setting up constitutions seek
to collect together all the features appropriate to their fundamental principle,
but in so doing they make a mistake, as has been said before in the passage
dealing with the causes of the destruction and the preservation of
constitutions. And now let us state the postulates, the ethical characters and
the aims of the various forms of democracy.
Now a fundamental principle
of the democratic form of constitution is liberty—that is what is
usually asserted, implying that only under this constitution do men participate
in liberty,
[
1317b]
[1]
for they assert this as the aim of every democracy. But one
factor of liberty is to govern and be governed in turn; for the popular
principle of justice is to have equality according to number, not worth, and if
this is the principle of justice prevailing, the multitude must of necessity be
sovereign and the decision of the majority must be final and must constitute
justice, for they say that each of the citizens ought to have an equal share; so
that it results that in democracies the poor are more powerful than the rich,
because there are more of them and whatever is decided by the majority is
sovereign. This then is one mark of
liberty which all democrats set down as a principle of the constitution. And one
is for a man to live as he likes; for they say that this is the function of
liberty, inasmuch as to live not as one likes is the life of a man that is a
slave. This is the second principle of democracy, and from it has come the claim
not to be governed, preferably not by anybody, or failing that, to govern and be
governed in turns; and this is the way in which the second principle contributes
to equalitarian liberty.
9
And these principles having been
laid down and this being the nature of democratic government, the following
institutions are democratic in character: election of officials by all from all;
government of each by all,
[20]
and of all
by each in turn; election by lot either to all magistracies or to all that do
not need experience and skill; no property-qualification for office, or only a
very low one; no office to be held twice, or more than a few times, by the same
person, or few offices except the military ones; short tenure either of all
offices or of as many as possible; judicial functions to be exercised by all
citizens, that is by persons selected from all, and on all matters, or on most
and the greatest and most important, for instance the audit of official
accounts, constitutional questions, private contracts; the assembly to be
sovereign over all matters, but no official over any or only over extremely few;
or else a council to be sovereign over the most important matters (and a council is the most
democratic of magistracies in states where there is not a plentiful supply of
pay for everybody—for where there is, they deprive even this office of
its power, since the people draws all the trials to itself when it has plenty of
pay, as has been said before in the treatise preceding this one
10); also
payment for public duties, preferably in all branches, assembly, law-courts,
magistracies, or if not, for the magistracies, the law-courts, council and
sovereign assemblies, or for those magistracies which are bound
11 to have common mess tables. Also inasmuch as
oligarchy is defined by birth, wealth and education, the popular qualifications
are thought to be the opposite of these, low birth, poverty, vulgarity. And in
respect of the magistracies it is democratic to have none tenable for life,
[
1318a]
[1]
and if any life-office has been left after an ancient
revolution, at all events to deprive it of its power and to substitute election
by lot for election by vote.
These
12 then are the features common to democracies. But what is
thought to be the extreme form of democracy and of popular government comes
about as a result of the principle of justice that is admitted to be democratic,
and this is for all to have equality according to number. For it is equality for
the poor to have no larger share of power than the rich, and not for the poor
alone to be supreme but for all to govern equally; for in this way they would
feel that the constitution possessed both equality and liberty. But the question follows, how will they
have equality? are the property-assessments of five hundred citizens to be
divided among a thousand and the thousand to have equal power to the five
hundred
13? or is equality on this principle
14 not to be arranged in this manner, but the
division into classes to be on this system, but then an equal number to be taken
from the five hundred and from the thousand and these to control the elections
and the law-courts? Is this then the justest form of constitution in accordance
with popular justice, or is it rather one that goes by counting heads?
15 For democrats say that justice is whatever seems
good to the larger number,
[20]
but
advocates of oligarchy think that it is whatever seems good to the owners of the
larger amount of property, for they say that the decision ought to go by amount
of property. But both views involve
inequality and injustice; for if the will of the few is to prevail, this means a
tyranny, since if one man owns more than the other rich men,
16 according to the oligarchic principle of justice it is just
for him to rule alone; whereas if the will of the numerical majority is to
prevail, they will do injustice by confiscating the property of the rich
minority, as has been said before.
17 What form of equality therefore would be one on which both
parties will agree must be considered in the light of the principles of justice
as defined by both sets. For they say that whatever seems good to the majority
of the citizens ought to be sovereign. Let us then accept this principle, yet not wholly without
qualification, but inasmuch as fortune has brought into existence two component
parts of the state, rich and poor, let any resolution passed by both classes, or
by a majority of each, be sovereign, but if the two classes carry opposite
resolutions, let the decision of the majority, in the sense of the group whose
total property assessment is the larger, prevail: for instance, if there are ten
rich citizens and twenty poor ones, and opposite votes have been cast by six of
the rich on one side and by fifteen of the less wealthy on the other, four of
the rich have sided with the poor and five of the poor with the rich; then the
side that has the larger total property when the assessments of both classes on
either side are added together carries the voting.
18
But if the totals fall out exactly
equal, this is to be deemed an impasse common to both sides, as it is at present
if the assembly or law-court is exactly divided;
[
1318b]
[1]
either a decision
must be made by casting lots or some other such device must be adopted. But on
questions of equality and justice, even though it is very difficult to discover
the truth about them, nevertheless it is easier to hit upon it than to persuade
people that have the power to get an advantage to agree to it; equality and
justice are always sought by the weaker party, but those that have the upper
hand pay no attention to them.
There being four kinds of democracy, the
best is the one that stands first in structure, as was said in the discourses
preceding these
19; it is also the oldest of them all, but by first I mean first
as it were in a classification of the kinds of common people. The best common
people are the agricultural population, so that it is possible to introduce
democracy as well as other forms of constitution where the multitude lives by
agriculture or by pasturing cattle. For owing to their not having much property
they are busy, so that they cannot often meet in the assembly, while owing to
their having
20 the necessaries of life they pass their time
attending to their farm work and do not covet their neighbors' goods, but find
more pleasure in working than in taking part in politics and holding office,
where the profits to be made from the offices are not large; for the mass of
mankind are more covetous of gain than of honor. And this is indicated by the fact that men endured the
tyrannies of former times, and endure oligarchies, if a ruler does not prevent
them from working or
[20]
rob them; for
then some of them soon get rich and the others free from want. And also, if they
have any ambition, to have control over electing magistrates and calling them to
account makes up for the lack of office, since in some democracies even if the
people have no part in electing the magistrates but these are elected by a
special committee selected in turn out of the whole number, as at
Mantinea, yet if they have the power of
deliberating on policy, the multitude are satisfied. (And this too must
be counted as one form of democracy, on the lines on which it once existed at
Mantinea.) Indeed it is for this reason that it is
advantageous for the form of democracy spoken of before, and is a customary
institution in it, for all the citizens to elect the magistrates and call them
to account, and to try law-suits, but for the holders of the greatest
magistracies to be elected and to have property-qualifications, the higher
offices being elected from the higher property-grades, or else for no office to
be elected on a property-qualification, but for officials to be chosen on the
ground of capacity. And a state governed in this way is bound to be governed
well (for the offices will always be administered by the best men with
the consent of the people and without their being jealous of the upper
classes), and this arrangement is certain to be satisfactory for the
upper classes and notables, for they will not be under the government of others
inferior to themselves, and they will govern justly because a different class
will be in control of the audits—since it is expedient to be in a state of suspense and not
to be able to do everything exactly as seems good to one, for liberty to do
whatever one likes cannot guard against the evil that is in every man's
character.
[
1319a]
[1]
Hence there necessarily results the condition of affairs that
is the most advantageous in the government of states—for the upper
classes to govern without doing wrong, the common people not being deprived of
any rights. It is manifest therefore that this is the best of the forms of
democracy, and why this is so—namely, because in it the common people
are of a certain kind.
For the purpose of making the people an agricultural
community, not only were some of the laws that were enacted in many states in
early times entirely serviceable, prohibiting the ownership of more than a
certain amount of land under any conditions or else of more than a certain
amount lying between a certain place and the citadel or city (and in
early times at all events in many states there was even legislation prohibiting
the sale of the original allotments; and there is a law said to be due to
Oxylus
21
with some similar provision, forbidding loans secured on a certain portion of a
man's existing estate), but
at the present day it would also be well to introduce reform by means of the law
of the Aphytaeans, as it is serviceable for the purpose of which we are
speaking; the citizens of Aphytis
22 although
numerous and possessing a small territory nevertheless are all engaged in
agriculture, for they are assessed not on the whole of their estates, but on
divisions of them so small that even the poor can exceed the required minimum in
their assessments.
23
After
the agricultural community
[20]
the best
kind of democracy is where the people are herdsmen and get their living from
cattle; for this life has many points of resemblance to agriculture, and as
regards military duties pastoral people are in a very well trained condition and
serviceable in body and capable of living in the open. But almost all the other
classes of populace, of which the remaining kinds of democracy are composed, are
very inferior to these, for their mode of life is mean, and there is no element
of virtue in any of the occupations in which the multitude of artisans and
market-people and the wage-earning class take part, and also owing to their
loitering about the market-place and the city almost all people of this class
find it easy to attend the assembly; whereas the farmers owing to their being
scattered over the country do not attend, and have not an equal desire for this
opportunity of meeting. And where it
also happens that the lie of the land is such that the country is widely
separated from the city, it is easy to establish a good democracy and also a
good constitutional government, for the multitude is forced to live at a
distance on the farms; and so, even if there is a crowd that frequents the
market-place, it is best in democracies not to hold assemblies without the
multitude scattered over the country.
24
It has then been stated how the best and first
kind of democracy is to be organized, and it is clear how we ought to organize
the other kinds also. For they must diverge in a corresponding order, and at
each stage we must admit the next inferior class.
[
1319b]
[1]
The last kind of democracy, because all the
population share in the government, it is not within the power of every state to
endure, and it is not easy for it to persist if it is not well constituted in
its laws and customs (but the things that result in destroying both
this state and the other forms of constitution have been nearly all of them
spoken of before
25).
With a view to setting up this kind of democracy and making the people powerful
their leaders usually acquire as many supporters as possible and admit to
citizenship not only the legitimate children of citizens but also the base-born
and those of citizen-birth on one side, I mean those whose father or mother is a
citizen; for all this element is specially congenial to a to democracy of this
sort. Popular leaders therefore
regularly introduce such institutions; they ought however only to go on adding
citizens up to the point where the multitude outnumbers the notables and the
middle class and not to go beyond that point; for if they exceed it they make
the government more disorderly, and also provoke the notables further in the
direction of being reluctant to endure the democracy, which actually took place
and caused the revolution at
Cyrene26; for a small base element is
overlooked, but when it grows numerous it is more in evidence.
[20]
A
democracy of this kind will also find useful such institutions as were employed
by Cleisthenes
27 at
Athens when he wished to
increase the power of the democracy, and by the party setting up the democracy
at
Cyrene; different tribes and
brotherhoods must be created outnumbering the old ones, and the celebrations of
private religious rites must be grouped together into a small number of public
celebrations, and every device must be employed to make all the people as much
as possible intermingled with one another, and to break up the previously
existing groups of associates. Moreover the characteristics of a tyranny also are all thought to be
democratic, I mean for instance licence among slaves, which may really be
advantageous for the popular party up to a point, and among women and children,
and indulgence to live as one likes; a constitution of this sort will have a
large number of supporters, as disorderly living is pleasanter to the mass of
mankind than sober living.
But it is not the greatest or only task of the
legislator or of those who desire to construct a constitution of this kind
merely to set it up, but rather to ensure its preservation; for it is not
difficult for any form of constitution to last for one or two or three days. We
must therefore employ the results obtained in the inquiries that we have made
already
28 into the causes of
the preservation and the destruction of constitutions, and attempt in the light
of those results to establish the safety of the state, carefully avoiding the
things that cause destruction, and enacting such laws both written and unwritten
[
1320a]
[1]
as shall best compass the results preservative of
constitutions, and not think that a measure is democratic or oligarchic which
will cause the state to be democratically or oligarchically governed in the
greatest degree, but which will cause it to be so governed for the longest time.
But the demagogues of today to
court the favor of the peoples often use the law-courts to bring about
confiscations of property. Hence those who are caring for the safety of the
constitution must counteract this by enacting that nothing belonging to persons
condemned at law shall be confiscated and liable to be carried to the public
treasury, but that their property shall be consecrated to the service of
religion; for male-factors will be no less on their guard, as they will be
punished just the same, while the mob will less often vote guilty against men on
trial when it is not going to get anything out of it. Also they must always make
the public trials that occur as few as possible, checking those who bring
indictments at random by big penalties; for they do not usually indict men of
the people but notables, whereas even with this form of constitution it is
desirable for all the citizens if possible to be friendly to the state, or
failing that, at all events not to think of their rulers as enemies. And inasmuch as the ultimate forms of
democracy tend to have large populations and it is difficult for their citizens
to sit in the assembly without pay, and this in a state where there do not
happen to be revenues is inimical to the notables
[20]
(for pay has to be obtained from a property-tax and
confiscation, and from corruption of the law-courts, which has caused the
overthrow of many democracies before now),—where therefore
there happen to be no revenues, few meetings of the assembly must be held, and
the law-courts must consist of many members but only sit a few days
(for this not only contributes to the rich not being in fear of the
cost of the system even if the well-off do not take the pay and only the poor
do, but also leads to far greater efficiency in the trial of law-suits, for the
well-to-do, though not wishing to be away from their private affairs for many
days, are willing to leave them for a short time), while where there are revenues men must not do what
the popular leaders do now (for they use the surplus for doles, and
people no sooner get them than they want the same doles again, because this way
of helping the poor is the legendary jar with a hole in it
29), but the truly democratic statesman must study how
the multitude may be saved from extreme poverty; for this is what causes
democracy to be corrupt. Measures must therefore be contrived that may bring
about lasting prosperity. And since this is advantageous also for the
well-to-do, the proper course is to collect all the proceeds of the revenues
into a fund and distribute this in lump sums to the needy, best of all, if one
can, in sums large enough for acquiring a small estate, or, failing this, to
serve as capital for trade or husbandry,
[
1320b]
[1]
and if this is not possible for
all, at all events to distribute the money by tribes or some other division of
the population in turn, while in the meantime the well-to-do must contribute pay
for attendance at the necessary assemblies, being themselves excused from
useless public services. By
following some such policy as this the Carthaginians have won the friendship of
the common people; for they constantly send out some of the people to the
surrounding territories and so make them well-off. And if the notables are men
of good feeling and sense they may also divide the needy among them in groups
and supply them with capital to start them in businesses. It is also a good plan
to imitate the policy
30 of
the Tarentines. They get the goodwill of the multitude by making property
communal for the purpose of use by the needy
31; also they have divided the whole number of their
magistracies into two classes, one elected by vote and the other filled by
lot,—the latter to ensure that the people may have a share in them,
and the former to improve the conduct of public affairs. And it is also possible
to effect this by dividing the holders of the same magistracy into two groups,
one appointed by lot and the other by vote.
We
have then said how democracies should be organized.
It is also fairly clear
from these considerations how oligarchies ought to be organized. We must infer
them from their opposites, reasoning out each form of oligarchy
[20]
with reference to the form of democracy opposite to
it, starting with the most well-blended and first form of oligarchy
32—and this is the one near to what is
called a constitutional government, and for it the property-qualifications must
be divided into one group of smaller properties and another of larger ones,
smaller properties qualifying their owners for the indispensable offices and
larger ones for the more important; and a person owning the qualifying property
must be allowed to take a share in the government,—introducing by the
assessment a large enough number of the common people to secure that with them
the governing class will have a majority over those excluded; and persons to
share in the government must constantly be brought in from the better class of
the common people. And the next form
of oligarchy also must be constructed in a similar way with a slight tightening
up of the qualification. But the form of oligarchy that stands opposite to the
last form of democracy, the most autocratic and tyrannical of the oligarchies,
in as far as it is the worst requires a correspondingly great amount of
safe-guarding. For just as human bodies in a good state of health and ships well
equipped with their crews for a voyage admit of more mistakes without being
destroyed thereby, but bodies of a morbid habit and vessels strained in their
timbers and manned with bad crews cannot endure even the smallest mistakes, so
also the worst constitutions need the most safe-guarding.
[
1321a]
[1]
Democracies therefore generally speaking are kept
safe by the largeness of the citizen-body, for this is the antithesis of justice
according to desert; but oligarchy on the contrary must manifestly obtain its
security by means of good organization.
And since
the mass of the population falls principally into four divisions, the farming
class, artisans, retail traders and hired laborers, and military forces are of
four classes, cavalry, heavy infantry, light infantry and marines, in places
where the country happens to be suitable for horsemanship, there natural
conditions favor the establishment of an oligarchy that will be powerful
(for the security of the inhabitants depends on the strength of this
element, and keeping studs of horses is the pursuit of those who own extensive
estates); and where the ground is suitable for heavy infantry,
conditions favor the next form of oligarchy (for heavy infantry is a
service for the well-to-do rather than the poor); but light infantry
and naval forces are an entirely democratic element. As things are therefore, where there is a large multitude
of this class, when party strife occurs the oligarchs often get the worst of the
struggle; and a remedy for this must be adopted from military commanders, who
combine with their cavalry and heavy infantry forces a contingent of light
infantry. And this is the way
33 in which the common people get the better over the
well-to-do in outbreaks of party strife:
[20]
being unencumbered they fight easily against cavalry and heavy
infantry. Therefore to establish
this force out of this class is to establish it against itself, but the right
plan is for the men of military age to be separated into a division of older and
one of younger men, and to have their own sons while still young trained in the
exercises of light and unarmed troops, and for youths selected from among the
boys to be themselves trained in active operations. And the bestowal of a share
in the government upon the multitude should either go on the lines stated
before,
34 and be
made to those who acquire the property-qualification, or as at
Thebes, to people after they have abstained
for a time from mechanic industries, or as at
Marseilles, by making a selection among members of the
governing classes and those outside it of persons who deserve
35 inclusion. And furthermore the most supreme offices also, which must be retained by those
within the constitution, must have expensive duties attached to them, in order
that the common people may be willing to be excluded from them, and may feel no
resentment against the ruling class, because it pays a high price for office.
And it fits in with this that they should offer splendid sacrifices and build up
some public monument on entering upon office, so that the common people sharing
in the festivities and seeing the city decorated both with votive offerings and
with building may be glad to see the constitution enduring; and an additional
result will be that the notables will have memorials of their outlay. But at
present the members of oligarchies do not adopt this course but the opposite,
for they seek the gains of office just as much as the honor; hence these
oligarchies are well described as miniature democracies.
36
[
1321b]
[1]
Let this then be a description of the proper way to organize the various forms
of democracy and of oligarchy.
As a consequence of what has been said
there follow satisfactory conclusions to the questions concerning
magistracies—how many and what they should be and to whom they should
belong, as has also been said before.
37 For without the indispensable
38 magistracies a state cannot
exist, while without those that contribute to good order and seemliness it
cannot be well governed. And furthermore the magistracies are bound to be fewer
in the small states and more numerous in the large ones, as in fact has been
said before
39; it
must therefore be kept in view what kinds of magistracies it is desirable to
combine and what kinds to keep separate. First among the indispensable services is the
superintendence of the market, over which there must be an official to
superintend contracts and good order; since it is a necessity for almost all
states that people shall sell some things and buy others according to one
another's necessary requirements, and this is the readiest means of securing
self-sufficiency, which seems to be the reason for men's having united into a
single state. Another
superintendency connected very closely with this one is the curatorship of
public and private properties in the city,
[20]
to secure good order and the preservation and rectification of
falling buildings and roads, and of the bounds between different persons'
estates, so that disputes may not arise about them, and all the other duties of
superintendence similar to these. An office of this nature is in most states
entitled that of City-controller, but it has several departments, each of which
is filled by separate officials in the states with larger populations, for
instance Curators of Walls, Superintendents of Wells, Harbors-guardians.
And another office also is
indispensable and closely akin to these, for it controls the same matters but
deals with the country and there regions outside the city; and these magistrates
are called in some places Land-controllers and in others Custodians of Forests.
These then are three departments of control over these matters, while another
office is that to which the revenues of the public funds are paid in, the
officials who guard them and by whom they are divided out to the several
administrative departments; these magistrates are called Receivers and Stewards.
Another magistracy is the one that has to receive a written return of private
contracts and of the verdicts of the law-courts; and with these same officials
the registration of legal proceedings and their institution have also to take
place. In some states this office also is divided into several, but there are
places where one magistracy controls all these matters; and these officials are
called Sacred Recorders, Superintendents, Recorders, and other names akin to
these. And after these is the office
connected with it but perhaps the most indispensable and most difficult of all,
the one concerned with the execution of judgement upon persons cast in suits and
those posted as defaulters according to the lists,
[
1322a]
[1]
and with the
custody of prisoners. This is an irksome office because it involves great
unpopularity, so that where it is not possible to make a great deal of profit
out of it men will not undertake it, or when they have undertaken it are
reluctant to carry out its functions according to the laws; but it is necessary,
because there is no use in trials being held about men's rights when the
verdicts are not put into execution, so that if when no legal trial of disputes
takes place social intercourse is impossible, so also is it when judgements are
not executed. Hence it is better for
this magistracy not to be a single office but to consist of several persons
drawn from different courts, and it is desirable similarly to try to divide up
the functions connected with the posting up of people registered as public
debtors, and further also in some cases for the sentences to be executed by
magistrates, especially by the newly elected ones preferably in suits tried by
the outgoing ones, and in those tried by men actually in office for the
magistrate executing the sentence to be different from the one that passed it,
for instance the City-controllers to execute the judgements passed on from the
Market-controllers and other magistrates those passed on by the
City-controllers. For the less odium involved for those who execute the
judgements, the more adequately the judgements will be carried out; so for the
same magistrates to have imposed the sentence and to execute it involves a
twofold odium, and for the same ones to execute it in all cases makes them the
enemies of everybody. And in many
places also the office of keeping custody of prisoners, for example at
Athens the office of the
magistrates known as the Eleven
40,
[20]
is separate
from the magistracy that executes sentences. It is better therefore to keep this
also separate, and to attempt the same device with regard to this as well. For
though it is no less necessary than the office of which I spoke, yet in practice
respectable people avoid it most of all offices, while it is not safe to put it
into the hands of the base, for they themselves need others to guard them
instead of being able to keep guard over others. Hence there must not be one
magistracy specially assigned to the custody of prisoners nor must the same
magistracy perform this duty continuously, but it should be performed by the
young, in places where there is a regiment of cadets
41 or guards, and by the magistrates, in successive
sections.
These magistracies therefore must be counted first as supremely
necessary, and next to them must be put those that are not less necessary but
are ranked on a higher grade of dignity, because they require much experience
and trustworthiness; in this class would come the magistracies concerned with
guarding the city and those assigned to military requirements. And both in peace
and in war it is equally necessary for there to be magistrates to superintend
the guarding of gates and walls and the inspection and drill of the citizen
troops. In some places therefore
there are more magistracies assigned to all these duties, and in others
fewer—for instance in the small states there is one to deal with all
of them. And the officers of this sort are entitled Generals or War-lords.
[
1322b]
[1]
And moreover if there are also cavalry or light infantry or
archers or a navy, sometimes a magistracy is appointed to have charge of each of
these arms also, and they carry the titles of Admiral, Cavalry-commander and
Taxiarch, and also the divisional commissions subordinate to these of Captains
of Triremes, Company-commanders and Captains of Tribes, and all the subdivisions
of these commands. But the whole of this sort of officers constituted a single
class, that of military command. This then is how the matter stands in regard to this office; but inasmuch as
some of the magistracies, if not all, handle large sums of public money, there
must be another office to receive an account and subject it to audit, which must
itself handle no other business; and these officials are called Auditors by some
people, Accountants by others, Examiners by others and Advocates by others. And
by the side of all these offices is the one that is most supreme over all
matters, for often the same magistracy has the execution of business that
controls its introduction, or presides over the general assembly in places where
the people are supreme; for the magistracy that convenes the sovereign assembly
is bound to be the sovereign power in the state. It is styled in some places the
Preliminary Council because it considers business in advance, but where there is
a democracy
42 it is more usually called a Council. This more or less
completes the number of the offices of a political nature; but another kind of superintendence is that
concerned with divine worship; in this class are priests and superintendents of
matters
[20]
connected with the
temples, the preservation of existing buildings and the restoration of those
that are ruinous, and the other duties relating to the gods. In practice this
superintendence in some places forms a single office, for instance in the small
cities, but in others it belongs to a number of officials who are not members of
the priesthood, for example Sacrificial Officers and Temple-guardians and
Stewards of Sacred Funds. And connected with this is the office devoted to the
management of all the public festivals which the law does not assign to the
priests but the officials in charge of which derive their honor from the common
sacrificial hearth, and these officials are called in some places Archons, in
others Kings and in others Presidents. To sum up therefore, the necessary offices of
superintendence deal with the following matters : institutions of religion,
military institutions, revenue and expenditure, control of the market, citadel,
harbors and country, also the arrangements of the law-courts, registration of
contracts, collection of fines, custody of prisoners, supervision of accounts
and inspections, and the auditing of officials, and lastly the offices connected
with the body that deliberates about public affairs. On the other hand, peculiar to the states that have more
leisure and prosperity, and also pay attention to public decorum, are the
offices of Superintendent of Women, Guardian of the Laws, Superintendent of
Children, Controller of Physical Training,
[
1323a]
[1]
and in addition to these the
superintendence of athletic and Dionysiac contests and of any similar displays
that happen to be held. Some of these offices are obviously not of a popular
character, for instance that of Superintendent of Women and of Children; for the
poor having no slaves are forced to employ their women and children as servants.
There are three offices which in some states supervise the election of the chief
magistrates—Guardians of the Laws, Preliminary Councillors and
Council; of these the Guardians of the Laws are an aristocratic institution, the
Preliminary Councillors oligarchic, and a Council democratic.
We have now therefore spoken in outline about almost all the
offices of state.