J. Adam, A. M. Adam, Commentary on Plato, Protagoras
J. Adam & A. M. Adam, Ed.

CHAPTER XV

1. μέχρι οὗπερ ἂν ζῶσι, i.e. οί παιδευόμενοι: in 326Dff. it is shown that education does not end when school is left, but goes on through life.

2. ἐπειδὰν θᾶττον seems not to occur elsewhere in the Platonic writings: in Alcib. I, 105A is ἐὰν θᾶττον. τάχιστα is more usual after such conjunctions. Kroschel quotes an imitation of this passage from De Rep. Laced. 2. 1 ἐπειδὰν τάχιστα οἱ παῖδες αὐτοῖς τὰ λεγόμενα ξυνιῶσιν, εὐθὺς μὲν ἐρ᾽ αὐτοῖς ραιδαγωγοὺς θεράποντας ἐφιστᾶσιν, εὐθὺς δὲ πέμπουσιν εἰς διδασκάλων μαθησομένους καὶ γράμματα καὶ μουσικὴν καὶ τὰ ἐν παλαίστρᾳ.

5. ὅπως βέλτιστος: so BT: there is no reason for inserting ὡς after ὅπως with Kroschel and Turner: βέλτιστος does not mean better than all others, but very good.

παρ᾽ ἕκαστον κτλ. ‘Est eo ipso tempore quo quidque vel fit vel dicitur’ (Heindorf).

7. τὸ μὲν δίκαιον κτλ. Sauppe well quotes Ter. Ad. 417-18 where a father νουθετεῖ his son ‘Hoc facito—Hoc fugito—Hoc laudi est—Hoc vitio datur’. Cf. Hor. Sat. I. 4. 105 ff.

9. τὰ μὲν ποίει, τὰ δὲ μὴ ποίει: τὰ μὲν is not δίκαιον, καλόν, ὅσιον, but quite general: ‘this do, that do not’. The τάδε μὲν— τάδε δέ of T is unnecessary; cf. τὸ μὲν—τὸ δέ in l. 7. The symmetry of the sentence is worth noting (a, b, b, a): first τὸ μὲν—τὸ δέ, next τόδε μὲν—τόδε δέ twice, last τὰ μὲν—τὰ δέ, the end recalling the beginning. Cf. note on καὶ κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν in Crito, 49B.

ἐὰν μὲν ἑκὼν πείθηται: without apodosis: see Goodwin, Moods and Tenses (1889), p. 179. This idiom occurs more than once in Homer: it is perhaps a remnant of the days when the conditional particles introduced a main sentence: certainly the Greeks were not conscious of any such ellipse as εὖ ἕξει.

10. ὥσπερ ξύλον διαστρεφόμενον. ξύλον is ‘a piece of wood’, not necessarily a dead log, as appears from Hdt. III. 47 εἰρίοισι ἀπὸ ξύλου (of the cotton tree) and other exx. in L. and S. The growing child is compared to a tree growing up and becoming crooked (note the present διαστρεφόμενον—καμπτόμενον). Plato frequently applies the metaphors ‘crooked’, ‘warped’ and the like to victims of vice and vicious education: cf. Gorg. 525A πάντα σκολιὰ ὑπὸ ψεύδους καὶ ἀλαζονείας; Theaet. 173A σμικροὶ δὲ καὶ οὐκ ὀρθοὶ τὰς ψυχάς.

11. εὐθύνουσιν—πληγαῖς. Cf. Arist. Ἀθην. πολιτ. ch. 8 τοὺς ἁμαρτάνοντας ηὔθυνεν κυρία οὖσα τοῦ ζημιοῦν καὶ κολάζειν (of the Areopagitic council). For εὐθύνειν (here passing into the meaning of ‘chastise’) see note on 324Aοὐδεὶς γὰρ κολάζει. To illustrate πληγαῖς Sauppe quotes the well-known line of Menander ὁ μὴ δαρεὶς ἄνθρωπος οὐ παιδεύεται.

12. εἰς διδασκάλων πέμποντες. It appears from 326Cthat there was no regular age for going to school; the parents decided in each case. Plato ordains (Laws, VII. 809E) that children shall learn γράμματα (i.e. reading and writing, ibid. 810B) from 10 to 13, and the lyre from 13 to 16.

πολὺ μᾶλλον—εὐκοσμίας. Protagoras' description of the aim of Athenian education agrees with the account of the Δίκαιος λόγος in the Clouds, 961 ff.

16. ὥσπερ τότε: above, 325Cἐπειδὰν θᾶττον συνιῇ τις τὰ λεγόμενα.

17. ἐπὶ τῶν βάθρων: i.e. as they sit on the benches: cf. above 315C παρατιθέασιν represents the works of the poets as intellectual food: cf. Theaet. 157C παρατίθημι ἑκάστων τῶν σοφῶν ἀπογεύσασθαι.

18. ποιητῶν ἀγαθῶν: Homer especially, and also Hesiod, Theognis, Phocylides. Cf. Laws, VII. 810E, from which passage it also appears that extracts were frequently made for committing to memory (ἐκμανθάνειν).

19. ἀναγκάζουσιν: μετὰ λύπης γὰρ ἡ μάθησις Arist. Pol. VIII. 1339^a. 28 (quoted by Sauppe). So Niceratus in Xenophon, Symp. III. 5 says that his father ἠνάγκασέ με πάντα τὰ Ὁμήρον ἔπη μαθεῖν.

20. διέξοδοι means finished narratives or descriptions (cf. λόγῳ διεξελθών and διεξιέναι in 320C. It is to be noted that so far we have not got beyond ποίησις ψιλή (i.e. unaccompanied by music): lyric poetry begins to be studied when the lyre has been learnt (l. 25).

23. ἕτερα τοιαῦτα: for the phrase see on Apol. 26A. The accusative (internal) depends on ἐπιμελοῦνται as in 325Cἐπιμελοῦνται πᾶσαν ἐπιμέλειαν and Laws, VII. 812E ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ὁ παιδευτὴς ἐπιμελείσθω: the whole phrase is equivalent to ἑτέραν τοιαύτην σωφροσύνης τε ἐπιμέλειαν ποιοῦνται. Verbs taking the external object in the genitive or dative are not precluded from taking the internal object in the accusative.

26. εἰς τὰ κιθαρίσματα ἐντείνοντες. ἐντείνειν εἰς is to stretch into, i.e. to ‘put into’: whence ἐντείνειν ἐς κύκλον χωρίον τρίγωνον ‘to describe a triangle in a circle’ (Meno, 87A); περὶ γάπ τοι τῶν ροιημάτων ὦν ρεροίηκας ἐντείνας τοὺς τοῦ Αἰσώρου λόγους of adapting to metre (Phaed. 60D); and here of accompanying poems on the lyre: the boys learn the poems and tunes (made by the poet) together, while the Citharist plays the lyre. Plato in the Laws, VII. 812D ff. requires the κιθαρίσματα to be identical with the tune to which the poem is sung: δεῖ—τοῖς φθόγγοις τῆς λύπας ρποσχπῆσθαι—τόν τε κιθαπιστὴν καὶ τὸν ραιδευόμενον, ἀροδιδόντας ρπόσχοπδα τὰ φθέγματα τοῖς φθέγμασι: τὴν δ᾽ ἑτεποφωνίαν καὶ ροικιλίαν τῆς λύπας, ἄλλα μὲν μέλη τῶν χοπδῶν ἱεισῶν, ἄλλα δὲ τοῦ τὴν μελω̣δίαν ξυνθέντος ροιητοῦ—ράντα τὰ τοιαῦτα μὴ προσφέρειν κτλ.

27. ῥυθμούς τε καὶ ἁρμονίας. ῥυθμοί times or rhythms (cf. Rep. III. 399E ff.), ἁρμονίαι scales (ibid. 398Dff.). ῥυθμός and ἁρμονία between them make up μουσική in the narrower sense: see Symp. 187A ff., where music is defined as περὶ ἁρμονίαν καὶ ῥυθμὸν ἐρωτικῶν ἐπιστήμη—περὶ ἁρμονίαν since it reconciles ὀξύ and βαρύ, περὶ ῥυθμόν since it reconciles ταχύ and βραδύ.

28. οἰκειοῦσθαι ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν παίδων. Sauppe quotes Rep. III. 401D κυριωτάτη ἐν μουσικῇ τροφή, ὅτι μάλιστα καταδύεται εἰς τὸ ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς ὄ τε ῥυθμὸς καὶ ἁρμονία καὶ ἐρρωμενέστατα ἅπτεται αὐτῆς.

29. εὐρυθμότεροι καὶ εὐαρμοστότεροι. See Rep. III. 400C ff., where, after it is shown that τὸ εὔρυθμον and τὸ εὐάρμοστον imply εὐλογία, Plato continues (400D) εὐλογία ἄρα καὶ εὐαπμοστία καὶ εὐσχημοσύνη καὶ εὐπυθμία εὐηθείᾳ ἀκολουθεῖ, οὐχ ἣν ἄνοιαν οὖσαν ὑροκοπιζόμενοι καλοῦμεν ὡς εὐήθειαν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ὡς ἀληθῶς εὖ τε καὶ καλῶς τὸ ἦθος κατεσκευασμένην διάνοιαν.

33. εἰς παιδοτρίβου: Protagoras passes to γυμναστική, the second great division of Greek education: Rep. II. 376E.

34. ὑπηρετῶσι τῇ διανοίᾳ. Plato asserts that the true object of γυμναστική is not to cultivate the body, but to educate the soul to the proper mean between hardness and softness: Rep. III. 410C ff. On the soul as the mistress of the body see Phaedo, ch. 43.

37. μάλιστα οἱ μάλιστα δυνάμενοι. The first μάλιστα is due to Heindorf: it is necessary to the meaning. Most of the editors insert the word μάλιστα not after ποιοῦσιν but after δυνάμενοι, explaining its loss by the presence of μάλιστα following: but it comes (we think) more naturally after ποιοῦσιν.

41. ἐκ διδασκάλων ἀπαλλαγῶσιν: ἐκ is rejected by Cobet (cf. Gorg. 514C ἐπειδὴ τῶν διδασκάλων ἀπηλλάγημεν): but the phrase is just as stereotyped as εἰς διδασκάλων, to which (in l. 39) it forms an appropriate contrast—in neither of the two cases were the Greeks (in all probability) conscious in common parlance of an ellipse. Sauppe quotes a fragment of Ar. Banqueters, 42 οὐκ εὐθὺς ἀπεδίδρασκες ἐκ διδασκάλου; Plutus, 84 ἐκ Πατροκλέους ἔρχομαι, and other parallels.

42. ἀναγκάζει μανθάνειν: hardly to be taken literally, but only in the sense that ignorance was no excuse for breaking the laws.

43. κατὰ τούτους ζῆν. After ζῆν occur in the MSS. the words κατὰ παράδειγμα. ‘Facile succurrat cuivis κατὰ τούτους ζῆν καθάπερ παράδειγμα—quamquam talia notanda potius quam statim corrigenda’ says Heindorf. Most recent editors bracket or reject the words, which are open to objection on several grounds, that the laws are not an example but a rule of life, and Plato does not use παράδειγμα precisely in this way, as well as from the harsh omission of ὡς. The suggestion of Sauppe that the words are a gloss on κατὰ τούτους by a scribe referring to the illustration which follows—‘as for example’— has much probability.

44. γραμματισται: see on γραμματιστοῦ, 312B

45. ὑπογράψαντες γραμμὰς τῇ γραφίδι should be understood of tracing (by dots or otherwise) the outlines of the lines (γραμμαί) which form letters. These outlines would be filled up by the pupil: see Blümner, Griechische Privataltherthümer, p. 315. The usual view (since Heindorf) has been to regard the γραμμαί as horizontal lines ruled for guidance; ‘ut pueri in schola directe s. ad lineam scribere iubentur, ita in vita quae agunt ad legis normam iis dirigenda sunt’ (Kroschel). Such a view is, however, inconsistent with the meaning of ὑπογράφειν and of ὑφήγησις, and (in view of Plato's statements as to the nature of Law) renders the simile inexact. ὑπογράφειν in Plato regularly refers to an outline drawing (as ὑποτυποῦσθαι to moulding in outline Tim. 76E) and is opposed to ἀπεργάσασθαι and (in Aristotle) to ἀναγράφειν, e.g. Rep. VIII. 548C-D οὐκοῦν— αὕτη μὲν ἡ ρολιτεία οὕτω γεγονυῖα καὶ τοιαύτη ἄν τις εἴη, ὡς λόγῳ σχῆμα ρολιτείας ὑρογπάψαντα μὴ ἀκπιβῶς ἀρεπγάσασθαι διὰ τὸ ἐξαπκεῖν μὲν ἰδεῖν καὶ ἐκ τῆς ὑρογπαφῆς τόν τε δικαιότατον καὶ τὸν ἀδικώτατον, and Theaet. 172E, where a litigant's ἀντωμοσία is called ὑπογραφή—a sort of outline drawing ὧν ἐκτὸς οὐ ῥητέον, but which his speech must simply ἀπεργάσασθαι. ὑφηγεῖσθαι is similarly used, only with the added idea of guiding: e.g. Rep. III. 403D-E οὐκοῦν εἰ τὴν διάνοιαν ἱκανῶς θεραπεύσαντες παραδοῖμεν αὐτῇ τὰ περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι, ἡμεῖς δὲ ὅσον τοὺς τύπους ὑφηγησαίμεθα—ὀρθῶς ἃν ποιοῖμεν; and Laws, X. 890C δεῖ ταῦτα οὕτω πράττειν διανοουμένους ὅπῃπερ ἂν ὁ νομοθέτης ὑφηγήσηται γράφων. The point of the simile is this. As the child draws his pen between the outlines of the lines forming letters (making e.g. into ), so we must keep our actions between certain outlines, which are the laws. Plato invariably regards νόμοι as only τύποι, within which our actions should fall: cf. Rep. II. 383C παντάπασιν—ἔγωγε τοὺς τύπους τούτους συγχωρῶ, καὶ ὡς νόμοις ἂν χρώ̣μην (whence νόμους ὑπογράφειν here and in Laws, V. 734E): see also Polit. 294A ff. τὸ δ᾽ ἄριστον οὐ τοὺς νόμους ἐστὶν ἰσχύειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἄνδπα τὸν μετὰ φπονήσεως βασιλικὸν—ὅτι νόμος οὐκ ἄν ροτε δύναιτο τό τε ἄπιστον καὶ τὸ δικαιότατον ἀκπιβῶς ρᾶσιν ἅμα ρεπιλαβὼν τὸ βέλτιστον ἐριτάττειν. αἱ γὰπ ἀνομοιότητες τῶν τε ἀνθπώρων καὶ τῶν ρπάξεων—οὐδὲν ἐῶσιν ἁρλοῦν ἐν οὐδενὶ ρεπὶ ἁράντων καὶ ἐρὶ ράντα τὸν χπόνον ἀποφαίνεσθαι τέχνην οὐδ᾽ ἡντινοῦν—for which reason in the Republic (VI. 497D) there must always be a power above the laws. The explanation which we have given does not disagree with the account of Seneca in his Epistles, XV. 2. 51 ‘Pueri ad praescriptum discunt. Digiti illorum tenentur et aliena manu per literarum simulacra ducuntur’: it is supported by Quintilian, I. 1. 27 ‘cum vero iam ductus sequi coeperit, non inutile erit eas (sc. literas) tabellae quam optime insculpi, ut per illos velut sulcos ducatur stilus’. It is probable that both these authors had the present passage in view.

It should be noted that γράφειν νόμους was a regular phrase: cf. the image in Rep. VI. 501A.

48. ὣς δὲ καὶ. ὥς for οὕτως is rare in Attic prose: Heindorf quotes (inter alia) Rep. VII. 530D κινδυνεύει ὡς πρὸς ἀστρονομίαν ὄμματα πέπηγεν, ὣς πρὸς ἐναρμόνιον φορὰν ὦτα παγῆναι. For δέ see above on 318C

53. εὐθῦναι regularly denotes the ‘putting straight’ or examination of a magistrate when his office expired. It is not clear whether Protagoras' philological zeal does not cause him to stretch a point in giving to the word a wider signification: but see on εὐθύνουσιν in 325D