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1.
[10]
What kind of actions then are to be called ‘compulsory’? Used without
qualification, perhaps this term applies to any case where the cause of the action lies in
things outside the agent, and when the agent contributes nothing. But when actions
intrinsically involuntary are yet in given circumstances deliberately chosen in preference
to a given alternative, and when their origin lies in the agent, these actions are to be
pronounced intrinsically involuntary but voluntary in the circumstances, and in preference
to the alternative. They approximate however rather to the voluntary class, since conduct
consists of particular things done,1 and the
particular things done in the cases in question are voluntary. But it is not easy to lay
down rules for deciding which of two alternatives is to be chosen, for particular cases
differ widely.1.
[11]
To apply the term ‘compulsory’ to acts done for the sake of pleasure
or for noble objects, on the plea that these exercise constraint on us from without, is to
make every action compulsory. For (1) pleasure and nobility between them
supply the motives of all actions whatsoever. Also (2) to act under
compulsion and involuntarily is painful, but actions aiming at something pleasant or noble
are done with pleasure. And (3) it is absurd to blame external things,
instead of blaming ourselves for falling an easy prey to their attractions; or to take the
credit of our noble deeds to ourselves, while putting the blame for our disgraceful ones
upon the temptations of pleasure. 1.
[12]
It appears therefore that an act is compulsory when its origin is from
outside, the person compelled contributing nothing to it.1.
[13]
(b) An act done through ignorance is in every case not voluntary,2 but it is involuntary only
when it causes the agent pain and regret: since a man who has acted