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Not so the temperate man; he only cares for them as right principle
enjoins.12.
Profligacy seems to be more voluntary than Cowardice. For the former is caused by
pleasure, the latter by pain, and pleasure is a thing we choose, pain a thing we avoid.
[2]
Also pain makes us beside ourselves: it destroys the
sufferer's nature; whereas pleasure has no such effect. Therefore Profligacy is the more
voluntary vice. And consequently it is the more reprehensible; since moreover it is easier
to train oneself to resist the temptations of pleasure, because these occur frequently in
life, and to practise resistance to them involves no danger, whereas the reverse is the
case with the objects of fear.
[3]
On the other hand, the possession of a cowardly character would seem to be more voluntary
than particular manifestations of cowardice: for cowardliness in itself is not painful,
but particular accesses of cowardice are so painful as to make a man beside himself, and
cause him to throw away his arms or otherwise behave in an unseemly manner; so that
cowardly actions actually seem to be done under compulsion.
[4]
But with the profligate on the contrary the particular acts are
voluntary, for they are done with desire and appetite, but the character in general is
less so, since no one desires to be a profligate.
[5]
The word Profligacy1 or
wantonness we also apply to the naughtiness of children,